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GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE—
LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER’S
SAVING GRACE
DANIEL M. VITAGLIANO†
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and law students alike have described the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “confused,”1
a “mess,”2 and “chaos.”3 Supreme Court justices have also
expressed disapproval and frustration.4 Legislative prayer, the
custom of beginning governmental sessions with prayer, is one
particular facet of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that lacks
†
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I also thank Professor Marc O. DeGirolami for thoughtful comments. It has been a
privilege working under their tutelage as a student fellow for the St. John’s Center
for Law and Religion. I will always be grateful for their mentorship. Finally, I thank
the editors and members of the St. John’s Law Review for their hard work preparing
my Note for publication.
1
E.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006); Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment
Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239,
294 (2003).
2
E.g., Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in
Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV.
315, 315 (2007); Gey, supra note 1, at 725.
3
E.g., Lawrence J. Chanice, Comment, Sante Fe Independent School District v.
Doe: Establishment Clause Chaos on the High School Gridiron, 75 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 137, 137 (2001); John W. Huleatt, Comment, Accommodation or Endorsement?
Stark v. Independent School District: Caught in the Tangle of Establishment Clause
Chaos, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 657, 657 (1998).
4
See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Assoc. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (mem.) (describing the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “in shambles”); Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 n.1 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our
jurisprudential confusion [under the Establishment Clause] has led to results that
can only be described as silly.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray . . . .”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence as “embarrassing”).
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clarity.5
The Supreme Court has only ever decided two
legislative prayer cases—Marsh v. Chambers6 in 1983 and Town
of Greece v. Galloway7 in 2014—denying certiorari in seven other
cases.8
Legislative prayer doctrine is “sometimes described as
‘carving out an exception’ to the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.”9
Unlike most other Establishment Clause
claims, the Court has refrained from applying one of its
pre-existing “tests”10—in particular, the Lemon test11—because
5
See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment
Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 222
(2008) (noting the “fundamental[] flaw[s]” in the Court’s Establishment Clause
framework and describing legislative prayer as an “unworkable situation”);
Christopher C. Lund, Leaving Disestablishment to the Political Process, 10 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 53 (2014) (describing the constitutional standards of
legislative prayer as “unclear”).
6
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
7
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
8
See Bormuth v. Jackson County, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Rowan
County v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (mem.); Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 571 U.S.
944 (2013) (mem.); Forsyth County v. Joyner, 565 U.S. 1157 (2012) (mem.); Turner v.
City Council of Fredericksburg, 555 U.S. 1099 (2009) (mem.); Simpson v.
Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 546 U.S. 937 (2005) (mem.); Snyder v. Murray
City Corp., 526 U.S. 1039 (1999) (mem.).
9
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796, 813
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). The Court’s reasoning in its most recent Establishment
Clause case, which involved the constitutionality of a large cross-shaped World War
I memorial on public land, indicates that the general approach taken by the Court in
its legislative prayer cases—that is, a history-and-tradition-based approach—is
broader than some may have first thought. See generally Am. Legion v. Am.
Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). For a broad survey of the Court’s use of
tradition as a means of constitutional interpretation, see generally Marc O.
DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (St. John’s Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 19-0019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3349187.
10
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no
pretense of subjecting Nebraska’s practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal
‘tests’ that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment
Clause.”). For an in-depth discussion of Establishment Clause standards and
theories, see Gey, supra note 1, at 728–64.
11
Under the Lemon test, courts must determine whether the challenged
government action (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a “principal or primary
effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (3) does “not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
603, 612–13 (1971) (first citing Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); then quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), Justice
O’Connor proposed a refinement to Lemon’s effect prong: that governmental action
“not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion.” This standard was adopted by a majority of the Court in
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“history support[s] the conclusion that legislative invocations are
compatible with the Establishment Clause.”12 This is not to say
legislative prayer is per se constitutional, because the Court has
made clear it is not. Only prayer practices that “fit[] within the
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures”
accord with the Establishment Clause.13 While the Supreme
Court strongly suggests that legislative prayer, as a general
matter, is constitutional, there is tremendous confusion over how
to adjudicate challenges to legislative prayer practices, especially
prayer practices that differ factually from those upheld in Marsh
and Town of Greece.
Two recent circuit court decisions highlight this confusion.
First, in Lund v. Rowan County, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, held that the Rowan County Board of Commissioners’
practice of beginning board meetings with a prayer composed and
delivered by one of its members violated the Establishment
Clause for the following four reasons: (1) the commissioners
served as the sole prayer givers; (2) the prayers exclusively
invoked, and sometimes advanced, Christianity; (3) the
commissioners invited attendees to participate in the prayers;
and (4) the local government setting increased the potential for
coercion.14 Two months later, in Bormuth v. County of Jackson,
the Sixth Circuit, also sitting en banc, upheld the Jackson

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69, 76 (1985), and has come to be known as the
“endorsement test.” For further discussion of the endorsement test, see generally
Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause for Celebration and
Sorrow, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1273 (2013). The Lemon test has been criticized by
Supreme Court justices, lower court judges, and scholars for decades. See, e.g., Am.
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081 nn.13–15 (2019) (collecting
criticisms). And although five or more sitting justices have, on multiple occasions,
rejected or expressed disapproval of the Lemon test in at least some contexts, see,
e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 passim; McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), it is yet to be explicitly overruled by a
majority of the Court, leaving scholars to speculate its fate, see, e.g., Marc O.
DeGirolami, Cross Purposes, PUB. DISCOURSE (June 24, 2019), https://www.thepublic
discourse.com/2019/06/53508/.
12
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575. Kent Greenawalt writes that the Court
dispensed with the Lemon test in the legislative prayer context because sometimes
“accurate application of the test yields results that are mistaken under the
constitutional provision.” KENT GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 50 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
13
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.
14
863 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (10-5 decision), cert denied,
138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018).
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County Board of Commissioners’ commissioner-led invocation
practice15—which was practically identical to Rowan County’s.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases.16
Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of Rowan County’s
petition for certiorari and authored an opinion joined by Justice
Gorsuch.17 He began his dissent rather bluntly: “This Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”18 He then
criticized the Fourth Circuit’s decision as “both unfaithful to
[the Court’s] precedents and a historical [sic].”19 Lastly, he
highlighted the Fourth Circuit’s failure to consider the country’s
long history of legislator-led prayer and argued the Court should
have taken the case to resolve the circuit split.20
One reason for the conflict between the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits’ rulings, as well as the general confusion over legislative
prayer—in Lund and Bormuth, legislator-led prayer—is the
Supreme Court’s failure to confront a doctrinal dichotomy:
whether legislative prayer constitutes government or private
speech and how classifying legislative prayer as one or the other
affects the Establishment Clause analysis.
This Note argues that Lund was decided incorrectly in part
because the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze the type of speech at
issue before assessing the constitutionality of the prayer practice.
This Note is composed of four parts. Part I surveys the Supreme
Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence—Marsh and Town of
Greece. Part II outlines Lund and Bormuth, and the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits’ dissimilar applications of the Supreme Court’s
precedent. Part III argues that courts must first classify
legislative prayers as either government or private speech before
assessing whether a prayer practice violates the Establishment
Clause. It further argues that legislator-led prayer is a form of
government speech. Lastly, Part IV, the most extensive of this
Note, argues that because legislator-led prayer is government
speech, courts must focus on the intent underlying legislator-led
prayer practices, and only practices motivated by impermissible
purposes should be deemed unconstitutional. It then proposes a
15
870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (9-6 decision), cert denied,
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).
16
Bormuth v. Jackson County, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.); Rowan
County v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (mem.).
17
Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 2566.
20
Id. at 2566–67.

2019]

GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE

813

framework to determine whether a legislative prayer practice
classified as government speech is motivated by impermissible
intent and analyzes under this framework the legislator-led
prayer practices in Lund and Bormuth.
I.

A.

THE SUPREME COURT’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
JURISPRUDENCE

Marsh v. Chambers

The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of
legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.21 In 1980, Nebraska
State Senator Earnest Chambers brought an action challenging
the legislature’s custom of beginning each session with a prayer
delivered by a paid chaplain.22 The chaplain was a Presbyterian
minister who had served in that post since 1965.23 Both the
District Court of Nebraska and the Eighth Circuit found that the
practice violated the Establishment Clause.24 The Supreme
Court disagreed.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger,
found that legislative prayer is “deeply embedded in the history
and tradition of this country” and has always coexisted with the
Establishment Clause.25 The Court highlighted that one of the
First Congress’s actions was to adopt a policy to appoint a paid
chaplain to deliver invocations at each congressional session,
with most states, including Nebraska, following its lead.26
Because the language of the Bill of Rights was agreed upon three
days after this policy was enacted, the Court concluded that the
Framers did not understand the Establishment Clause to
prohibit legislative prayer.27

21

463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 586 (D. Neb. 1980).
23
Id.
24
The district court found that although the prayers themselves did not violate
the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test, the use of public funds to finance a
chaplain “of one faith, of one denomination, of one set of religious beliefs, embodied
in one person” was impermissible. Id. at 588–89, 592. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
the judgment but held that the practice taken as a whole violated all three prongs of
Lemon. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982).
25
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
26
Id. at 787–89.
27
Id. at 788, 791.
22
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The Court went on to dismiss arguments contesting three
specific features of the Nebraska Legislature’s prayer practice.
First, the Court held that “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s
reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, . . . his
long tenure does not in itself conflict with the Establishment
Clause.”28 Second, the Court took no issue with the chaplain’s
remuneration because the Continental Congress and some of the
early states compensated their chaplains.29 Finally, the Court
held that the Judeo-Christian nature of the prayers was
acceptable because “there [wa]s no indication that the prayer
opportunity ha[d] been exploited to proselytize or advance any
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”30 Accordingly, the
Court held that Nebraska’s prayer practice did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the prayer practice
would fail any of the Court’s Establishment Clause tests.31 He
also expressed concerns that legislative prayer would spark
political controversies along religious lines and ultimately
alienate religious minorities.32 Justice Stevens, also in dissent,
argued that the chaplain’s sixteen-year tenure reflected an
unconstitutional preference for Presbyterianism.33
B. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter
Nine years later, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, a case involving the constitutionality of a
crèche displayed in a courthouse, the Court discussed its holding
in Marsh and indicated that legislative prayers must be
nonsectarian, to avoid unconstitutional endorsement of
a particular creed or sect.34
This generated tremendous
35
confusion among lower courts and spurred rigorous debate
among scholars.36
28

Id. at 793–94 (explaining that the chaplain “was reappointed because his
performance and personal qualities were acceptable to the body appointing him”).
29
Id. at 794.
30
Id. at 794–95 (“That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular prayer.”).
31
Id. at 800–01, 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 808.
33
Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34
492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (explaining that the prayers at issue in Marsh were
constitutional because “the particular chaplain had ‘removed all references to
Christ’ ” (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14)).
35
Compare Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding unconstitutional a town council’s prayer practice because the prayers
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C. Town of Greece v. Galloway
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided its second legislative
prayer case: Town of Greece v. Galloway.37 In 1999, Greece, New
York, began opening its town board meetings with invocations
delivered by local volunteer ministers.38 Greece selected these
ministers through an informal process of calling congregations
listed in the town directory.39 The town welcomed invocations
from clergymen or laypeople of any faith—or no faith—and never
denied a would-be prayer-giver’s request.40 However, almost all
of the congregations in Greece were Christian; and until 2007, all
of the prayer-givers were too.41 Susan Galloway and Linda
Stephens sued, claiming the town was sponsoring sectarian
prayers and expressing a preference for Christian prayer-givers,
in violation of the Establishment Clause.42
The Supreme Court ruled in the town’s favor. The Court, in
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, began by noting that
the Establishment Clause—legislative prayer practices in
particular—“must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical
practices and understandings.’ ”43 The Court framed the issue as

“ ‘frequently’ contained references to ‘Jesus Christ,’ and thus promoted one religion
over all others” (footnote omitted)), with Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d
1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[T]he context of the decision in
Marsh . . . underscores the conclusion that the mere fact a prayer evokes a
particular concept of God is not enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”).
36
Compare Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of
Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 995–96 (2010) (arguing that County
of Allegheny created a “nonsectarian standard” for legislative prayer), with Robert
Luther III & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the “Prayer Police”: Why the
First Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands a “Practice
Focused” Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 571 (2008) (“Marsh permits the use
of sectarian references despite the confusion within lower federal courts generated
by reliance on dicta contained in County of Allegheny . . . .”).
37
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
38
Id. at 570.
39
Id. at 571.
40
Id.
41
Id. Once litigation commenced, however, Greece invited a Jewish layman and
the chairman of a Baha’i temple to deliver invocations and granted a Wiccan
priestess’s request to do so. Id. at 572.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 576–77 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)) (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the precise
boundaries of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific
practice is permitted.”).
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“whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”44
The Court held that Greece’s sectarian invocations were well
within the scope of traditional legislative prayer, dismissing
County of Allegheny’s discussion of Marsh as sheer dictum.45 The
Court found that requiring legislative prayer to be nonsectarian
would force legislatures and judges to monitor and censor
religious speech, impermissibly entangling government in
religious affairs.46 It further explained that once prayer is
invited into the public domain, the government cannot restrict
speakers from praising their deity as conscience dictates.47 The
Court made clear, however, that the content of legislative prayers
is not unrestrained: the prayers must serve a legitimate
purpose—for example, “to unite lawmakers in their common
effort” or “to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long
part of the Nation’s heritage.”48 Prayer practices that over time
reflect a “pattern” of denigration or proselytization will
necessarily fall short of these permissible purposes and trigger
constitutional limits.49 Lastly, the Court held that the eight-year
span of solely Christian ministers was constitutionally
insignificant because Greece never discriminated against
non-Christian prayer-givers.50 Accordingly, the Court upheld
Greece’s prayer practice.51

44

Id. at 577.
Id. at 579–80.
46
Id. at 581 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 187–89 (2012)).
47
Id. at 582.
48
Id. at 582–83.
49
Id. at 583, 585. Two remarks explicitly denigrated nonbelievers and religious
minorities, but the Court found that these two instances “d[id] not despoil a practice
that on the whole reflect[ed] and embrace[d] our tradition.” Id. at 585.
50
Id. at 585–86 (cautioning against affirmative steps to “promote ‘a “diversity”
of religious views’ ” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring))).
51
The Court also dismissed arguments that the prayers were unduly coercive. A
plurality of the Court found that a reasonable observer would likely be familiar with
the tradition of legislative prayer and understand that the practice is not meant to
proselytize. Id. at 587 (plurality opinion) (citing Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700,
720–21 (2010) (plurality opinion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
308 (2000)). The plurality also acknowledged alternatives for attendees who disagree
with the prayers: exit the room, arrive after the invocation, or voice a later protest.
Id. at 590. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
arguing that only “actual legal coercion” by “force of law and threat of penalty” is
relevant to the Establishment Clause, not psychological coercion as alleged by the
45
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The case drew several other opinions. Justice Alito, in
concurrence, stressed that the predominance of Christian
ministers resulted from carelessness, not discriminatory intent.52
He also discussed how the delegates to the First Continental
Congress, despite being divided in religious sentiments, approved
of emphatically Christian prayer as a means to unite, not
divide.53 Justice Kagan, in dissent, conceded that Marsh was
correctly decided, but she distinguished Greece’s practice in that
the prayers offered “were predominantly sectarian.”54 She also
argued that Greece’s failure to recognize and accommodate
pluralism violated the constitutional command of religious
neutrality.55
II. ENTER LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
Town of Greece was harshly criticized by scholars for its
inconsistent and contradictory language and for its failure to
dictate a definitive test.56 Even after Town of Greece, tremendous
uncertainty and confusion remains regarding the proper
standard to adjudicate challenges to legislative prayer practices;
hence, the conflicting outcomes in Lund and Bormuth.
A.

Lund v. Rowan County

In March 2013, Nancy Lund, Liesa Montag-Siegal, and
Robert Voelker sued Rowan County, North Carolina, over its
commissioner-led prayer practice.57 The county board would
begin each bimonthly meeting with an invocation delivered by

plaintiffs. Id. at 608–10 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
52
Id. at 593–94 (Alito, J., concurring).
53
Id. at 600–01.
54
Id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 257 n.93 (2014) (stating that a “flat contradiction”
concerning coercion “reflects poorly on the coherence of the opinion”); Lund, supra
note 5, at 52–53 (“While the Court is clear about its desire to raise the bar, it is
profoundly unclear on where exactly it means to set it. The Court offers a multitude
of vague and slightly inconsistent phrases. . . . The predictable result is that no one
has any idea where the line is.”); Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity of Hopeless
Disarray?: An Examination of Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment
Clause, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 408 (2015) (opining that the Court “was unwilling
or unable to” clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence); see also infra text
accompanying notes 103, 228–230.
57
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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one of its five elected commissioners.58 Only commissioners were
permitted to deliver the invocation, doing so on a rotating basis
as an incident of time-honored custom.59 All in attendance would
be asked to rise and join in the prayer.60
Over a
five-and-a-half-year period, “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior” were
referenced in ninety-seven percent of the board’s prayers.61
In July 2017, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
the Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice
violated the Establishment Clause.62 In an opinion authored by
Judge Wilkinson, the majority emphasized two conceptual
differences in Rowan County’s practice from those upheld by the
Supreme Court: (1) legislators themselves, not outside ministers,
led the prayers; and (2) the prayer opportunity was restricted to
legislators.63 Thus, the court found that Rowan County’s prayer
practice created a higher risk of religious endorsement and
coercion than the prayer practices upheld in Marsh and Town of
Greece.64
Judge Wilkinson acknowledged the history and tradition of
lawmaker-led prayer in federal, state, and local governments but
found that while such prayer “is not inherently unconstitutional,”
“the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional
inquiry.”65 He stressed the distinction between extending, as
opposed to restricting, the prayer opportunity to legislators.66 By
limiting the prayer opportunity to commissioners—all of whom
were Protestant Christian—the board restricted what faiths
could be referenced, “creat[ing] a ‘closed universe’ of
prayer-givers dependent solely on election outcomes.”67 Judge

58

Id. at 272.
Id. at 272–73.
60
Id. at 272.
61
Id. at 273 (citing Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 714
(M.D.N.C. 2015)).
62
Id. at 272.
63
Id. at 277.
64
Id. at 278–79.
65
Id. at 280.
66
Id. at 279.
67
Id. at 281–82 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723
(M.D.N.C. 2015)).
59
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Wilkinson expressed concerns over the potential for “political
division along religious lines” should prayer-giver selection be
left to the political process.68
Judge Wilkinson then analyzed three additional aspects of
the board’s prayer practice. First, he reviewed the content of the
prayers.69 He found that the board unconstitutionally advanced
Christianity “[b]y proclaiming the spiritual and moral supremacy
of Christianity, characterizing the political community as a
Christian one, and urging adherents of other religions to embrace
Christianity.”70
Second, Judge Wilkinson assessed the
commissioners’ requests for attendees to stand and join in the
prayers. These requests, he determined, were indicative of “an
effort ‘to promote religious observance among the public.’ ”71 He
also emphasized the proselytizing effect of such invitations
coming from town leaders, which Town of Greece explicitly
cautioned against.72 Finally, the local intimate setting was
deemed unduly coercive because the attendees’ alternatives—
arrive late, leave the room, or remain seated—“served only to
marginalize.”73
Accordingly, given “the totality of the
circumstances,” the Fourth Circuit held that the Rowan County
Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice violated the
Establishment Clause.74
B. Bormuth v. County of Jackson
In August 2013, Peter Bormuth brought an action
challenging the constitutionality of the Jackson County,
Michigan, Board of Commissioners’ commissioner-led prayer
practice.75 At the start of each board meeting, the chairman of
the board would request all present to stand and bow their
heads.76 On a rotating basis, one of the board’s nine elected
68
Id. at 282 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)). The prayer
practice did in fact create a contentious campaign issue in the 2016 board elections,
with two incumbents who favored the practice prevailing over two challengers. Id.
69
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s warning to not supervise and
censor religious speech but explained that an inquiry into the “entire record” was
necessary. Id. at 283.
70
Id. at 286.
71
Id. at 287 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 588 (2014)
(plurality opinion)).
72
Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion)).
73
Id. at 288.
74
Id. at 289.
75
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
76
Id.
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commissioners would then deliver a solemn, often Christian,
invocation.77 Other commissioners would not review the content
of prayers individually or as a board.78 Bormuth, a self-professed
Pagan and Animist, found the prayers “severely offensive” and
raised his concerns to the board during the public comment
segment of a meeting.79 Bormuth claimed that when he did so, a
commissioner “swiveled his chair and turned his back to [him].”80
He alleged further that after he commenced this lawsuit, the
board declined to appoint him to a planning committee, selecting
two less-qualified candidates instead.81
In September 2017, an en banc court of the Sixth Circuit
upheld the Jackson County Board of Commissioners’ prayer
practice.82 In an opinion authored by Judge Griffin, the majority
emphasized Town of Greece’s instruction “to focus upon ‘the
prayer opportunity as a whole’ in light of ‘historical practices and
understandings.’ ”83
Judge Griffin found that legislator-led
prayer was amply supported by history and tradition.84 In
addition, he noted the Supreme Court’s recognition of
legislator-led prayer. He pointed to the Marsh Court citing an
amicus brief describing how numerous legislatures permit
member-led invocations and how in Town of Greece a councilman
had delivered an invocation and others had offered silent
prayers.85
Accordingly, the court found no constitutionally
significant
distinction
between
lawmaker-led
and
lawmaker-approved prayer.86
Next, Judge Griffin considered the content of the prayers.
The predominantly Christian prayers were consistent with those
accepted by the Framers and in compliance with the content
restrictions dictated in Town of Greece.87 Further, the individual
77

Id. at 497–98.
Id. at 498.
79
Id. at 498–99.
80
Id. at 499.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 498. The court acknowledged at the outset that its decision conflicts
with the Fourth Circuit’s Lund decision, but it found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
“unpersuasive.” Id. at 509 n.5.
83
Id. at 509 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576,
585 (2014)).
84
Id. at 509–10.
85
Id. at 510–11.
86
Id. at 512.
87
Id. Bormuth cited part of a prayer that he claimed denigrated minority faiths:
“Bless the Christians worldwide who seem to be targets of killers and extremists.”
Id. However, the court found that even assuming this language signaled disfavor
78
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faiths of the commissioners—all nine of whom were Christian—
were deemed insignificant given the diversity of faiths—that is,
the many different denominations—within Christianity and the
“dynamic, not static,” composition of the board, which is subject
to change with each election.88 Judge Griffin emphasized that
the policy was facially neutral and nondiscriminatory; and given
Marsh’s rejection of the Lemon test, the court dismissed claims of
religious endorsement.89
Lastly, the court dismissed Bormuth’s arguments regarding
coercion. First, Judge Griffin found that the commissioners’
“commonplace,” “reflexive” requests for attendees to rise and
remain silent in no way mandated participation.90 Further,
leaving the room, arriving late, or protesting after the prayer
were deemed sufficient alternatives to protect against perceived
pressure to participate.91 Second, while the commissioners “did
react poorly to Bormuth’s actions,” context showed that “they
reacted not to his beliefs but to the litigious way he chose to
express them”—that is, filing another lawsuit.92 Third, there was
no support in the record for Bormuth’s assertion that he did not
receive his desired appointment because he objected to the prayer
practice.93
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld Jackson
County’s prayer practice.

toward dissenters, this sole remark did not despoil the board’s prayer practice. Id.
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585).
88
Id. at 513.
89
Id. at 513–15.
90
Id. at 517 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 599 (Alito, J., concurring)).
91
Id. at 516 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion)). The
court reasoned that despite the Fourth Circuit finding that these options only
marginalized the attendees, “they [were] options Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion
expressly approved.” Id. at 516 n.11 (citing Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268,
320 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting)).
92
Id. at 518 & n.12 (citing five additional cases where Bormuth sued
government officials).
93
Id. at 519.
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III. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
Much has since been written about legislator-led prayer.94
Amid this growing body of scholarship, there is no consensus on
how courts should assess the constitutionality of legislator-led
prayer practices. Many authors criticize the Supreme Court for
failing to sufficiently clarify a standard for legislative prayer that
can apply broadly to the many unique prayer practices legislative
bodies engage in.95 Some authors have even advanced new
standards or tests for legislator-led prayer.96
This Note argues that the general confusion over legislative
prayer is due in part to courts’ failure to first classify the prayers
as either government or private speech. This speech inquiry is
imperative because “different Establishment Clause rules apply
to different types of speakers.”97 Considering First Amendment

94
See generally, e.g., James A. Hill, Thou Shalt Not Speak: Why the
Establishment Clause Should Be Concerned with Legislative Prayer in Bormuth v.
County of Jackson, 23 TRINITY L. REV. 1 (2018); Nicholas J. Hunt, Let Us Pray: The
Case for Legislator-Led Prayer, 54 TULSA L. REV. 49 (2018); John Gavin, Comment,
Praying for Clarity: Lund, Bormuth, and the Split over Legislator-Led Prayer, 59
B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 104 (2018); Mary Nobles Hancock, Note, God Save the
United States and This Honorable County Board of Commissioners: Lund, Bormuth,
and the Fight over Legislative Prayer, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019); Joe H.
Nguyen, Note, The Establishment Clause: The Lemon and Marsh Conflict, Where
Lund and Bormuth Leave Us, and the Constitutionality of Exclusive, Legislator-Led
Prayer, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135 (2019); Samuel Taxy, Comment, Pressure to
Pray? Thinking Beyond the Coercion Test for Legislator-Led Prayer, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 143 (2019); Robert W. T. Tucci, Comment, A Moral Minefield: Resolving the
Dispute over Legislator-Led Invocations, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 601 (2018).
95
See, e.g., Gavin, supra note 94, at 111 (noting that Town of Greece left an
“unclear standard”); Nguyen, supra note 94, at 155 (“[T]he area of legislative prayer
requires further clarification by the Supreme Court.”); Recent Cases, Lund v. Rowan
County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 131 HARV. L. REV. 626, 630 (2017)
(claiming the Fourth Circuit was “without a framework” and “left with little
guidance” due to the factual distinctions between legislator-led prayer and the
prayer practices in Marsh and Town of Greece); Taxy, supra note 94, at 184 (“Due to
the lack of clarity in Town of Greece, many questions pending its resolution went
unanswered, particularly how courts should analyze prayer given at
local government meetings by councilmembers themselves.”); see also sources cited
supra note 56.
96
See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 94, at 69 (proposing a “hybrid assessment”
consisting of “a historical inquiry” and “an ‘actual legal coercion’ test”); Taxy, supra
note 94, at 143 (arguing the practice “should be per se forbidden”); Tucci, supra note
94, at 619 (proposing a “strict scrutiny standard”).
97
Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian
Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1061 (2011) [hereinafter
Gaylord, When the Exception]; see also Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially
Religious Government Speech: Summum’s Impact on the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 391 (2010) [hereinafter
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speech principles when assessing the constitutionality of
legislative prayer practices would clarify how courts should apply
the limits on legislative prayer dictated in Marsh and Town of
Greece. Specifically, First Amendment speech principles bear on
issues including the claims challengers may pursue,98
prayer-giver
selection,99
content-based
restrictions
or
requirements imposed by the legislature,100 and the content of the
prayers.101
The Supreme Court sidestepped the speech issue entirely in
Town of Greece.102 Some parts of Town of Greece lend credence to
a finding that the prayers were government speech, while other
parts suggest private speech.103 Thus, this doctrinal dichotomy—
whether legislative prayer is government or private speech and
how classifying legislative prayer as one or the other affects the
Establishment Clause analysis—remains unanswered by the
Court.104
A.

Legislative Prayer as Government Speech

Classifying legislative prayer as government speech is a
fairly well-explored proposition. Professor Gaylord writes that
legislative prayer is “a specific form of facially religious
government speech” because the government controls the speech
and conveys its own message.105 He writes further that where a
third party—for example, a guest minister—offers the invocation,
Gaylord, Facially Religious Government Speech] (“One must know whether the
speech is government speech to know which Establishment Clause test to apply.”).
98
See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
99
See infra Section IV.C.2.
100
See infra Section IV.C.3.
101
See infra Section IV.C.4.
102
Both parties and several amici raised arguments over whether the prayers
were private or government speech. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Freedom
from Religion Foundation in Support of Respondents at 27–31, Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5348583 (arguing that
legislative prayer is government speech); Brief for Seven Prayer-Givers as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–9, Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (No. 12-696),
2013 WL 4011047 (arguing that legislative prayer is private speech).
103
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech, 6 CAL. L.
REV. CIR. 37, 41–44 (2015).
104
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, recently cited
Marsh as a case concerning “government-sponsored prayer” in which “the
government itself is engaging in religious speech.” Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 910–11 (2019) (mem.)
(Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). This suggests that these three
justices would classify legislative prayer as government speech.
105
Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1049–50.
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the government essentially “adopt[s]” the speech as its own and
conveys the speaker’s message.106 Professor Haupt asserts that
Marsh was a case “decided on the merits as government
speech.”107 But Haupt, unlike Gaylord, claims that assigning
responsibility for speech is not as easy when a third party
delivers the invocation.108
Some, however, disagree that legislative prayer is
government speech. For example, Robert Luther III contends
that legislative prayer cannot be government speech because
“government cannot itself pray.”109 Professor Corbin argues that
the prayers in Town of Greece were neither government nor
private speech, but “mixed speech”—that is, speech that contains
both governmental and private elements and “cannot be cleanly
designated into one category or the other.”110 While there is a
significant body of scholarship on mixed speech,111 including
proposed standards for mixed speech cases,112 the Supreme Court
has consistently classified expression as either exclusively
governmental or exclusively private.113

106

Id. at 1051.
Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571, 617 (2011).
108
Id.
109
Robert Luther III, “Unity Through Division”: Religious Liberty and the Virtue
of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1, 20 (2009).
110
Corbin, supra note 103, at 38, 41 (“The message is the result of private and
government control—the government created the prayer program and invited clergy
to give prayers, while the clergy determined the content of the prayers.”).
111
See generally, e.g., Corbin, supra note 103; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed
Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 603
(2008); Haupt, supra note 107.
112
Professor Corbin argues mixed speech should be recognized as its own
category and regulations should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Corbin, supra
note 111, at 671–72, 675. For a critique of this argument, see Andy G. Olree,
Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 408–10 (2009). Alternatively,
Professor Haupt champions a continuum framework that assigns speech
responsibility based on who maintains “effective control” over the message. Haupt,
supra note 107, at 587–92. Further, she argues that where effective control is
equally distributed between private and government actors, speech should be
classified as “truly hybrid,” with “First Amendment policy interests support[ing]
a finding of private speech despite considerable government involvement.” Id. at
618–19, 628.
113
Corbin, supra note 111, at 672; see, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760
(2017) (“Trademarks are private, not government, speech.”); Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“[S]pecialty license
plates . . . convey government speech.”).
107

2019]

GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE

825

Lower courts tend to favor the government speech
approach.114 Courts that have classified legislative prayer as
government speech have held that this finding restricts the type
of claims challengers may pursue, permitting only Establishment
Clause claims and foreclosing claims under the Free Exercise,
Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses.115 But courts have
not considered government speech principles beyond this
threshold matter. Arguments to consider government speech
principles were advanced in dissenting opinions in both Lund
and Bormuth,116 but the majority opinions are devoid of any
application of such principles.117
B. Classifying Legislator-Led Prayer as Government Speech
Legislator-led prayer should be classified as government
speech. When assigning responsibility for speech, courts must
decide “whether a government entity is speaking on its own
behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”118 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that this is not always easy.119
Notwithstanding, when legislators themselves offer prayers,
114
See, e.g., Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142,
158–59 (3d Cir. 2019) (classifying legislative prayer offered by a guest chaplain as
government speech); Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354
(4th Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation) (classifying
legislator-led prayer as government speech); Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (classifying legislative prayer
offered by a guest minister as government speech).
115
See, e.g., Fields, 936 F.3d at 163 (rejecting claims under the Free Exercise,
Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses); Turner, 534 F.3d at 356 (rejecting a
claim under the Free Exercise Clause); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287–88 (rejecting
claims under the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses).
116
In Lund, Judge Agee argued that the majority erred in treating significant
the prayer-givers’ identities. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 308 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting). More specifically, he argued that because
legislative prayer is a form of government speech, the public would see no difference
between paid chaplains, guest ministers, and the lawmakers who select them. Id.
Conversely, in Bormuth, Judge Moore emphasized the prayer-givers’ identities,
arguing that because the prayers are government speech, there is increased
potential for endorsement of Christianity and coercion. Bormuth v. County of
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 537 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting).
117
Judge Wilkinson seemingly recognized that legislator-led prayer is
government speech, see Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (“[I]n Rowan County, the prayer-giver
was the state itself.”); id. at 290 (“When one of Rowan County’s commissioners leads
his constituents in prayer, he is not just another private citizen. He is a
representative of the state, and he gives the invocation in his official capacity as a
commissioner.”), but he failed to consider the effects of this in his analysis.
118
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
119
Id.
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determining who is speaking is rather straightforward.
Legislator-led prayer is prayer by a legislator—“it is government
speech by definition.”120 To be sure, a formal analysis is
warranted.
The Supreme Court considers three factors in determining
whether speech is attributable to the government. First, the
Court looks to whether the mode of expression is “often closely
identified in the public mind with the government.”121 Rather
than speculate to the public’s perception, the Court analyzes
whether the speech has a governmental purpose and is
governmental in nature.122 For example, in Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the Court found that
members of the public perceive Texas specialty license plates as
government messages because the designs are owned by the
state, the plates serve to register and identify vehicles, and the
top of each plate reads “TEXAS.”123
Legislator-led prayer
similarly serves governmental purposes. It “lend[s] gravity to
the occasion,” “unite[s] lawmakers in their common effort,”124 and
“eases the task of governing.”125 Furthermore, legislator-led
prayer is governmental in nature. The invocations are delivered
by legislators at government meetings moments before
policymaking126 or other governmental functions.127 And just as

120

Lund, supra note 36, at 1017; cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421
(2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”).
121
Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.
122
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248
(2015). In Bormuth, Judge Sutton, in a rather perfunctory manner, stated that most
people perceive legislative prayer as “a petition by the individual, not the State or
City.” Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 523 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Sutton, J., concurring). But this unsupported statement is nothing more than
armchair speculation, which undermines Judge Sutton’s determination. See Daniel
J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech,
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 36–37, 66 (2017) (arguing that judicial speculation with
regard to public perception is “likely to be biased and inaccurate” and “colored by
ideological motivation”).
123
135 S. Ct. at 2248.
124
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583, 587 (2014).
125
Id. at 587 (plurality opinion).
126
See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 290 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(“[T]he commissioner remains on the scene to participate in the Board’s
decision-making.”); see also, e.g., Commissioner Meeting, ROWAN COUNTY
(Feb. 18, 2013) (00:00–01:50), http://rowancountync.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=357 (approving the prior meeting’s minutes and moving to add a
public hearing to the consent agenda directly after a legislator-led invocation).
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license plates bear the state’s name or insignia, a town seal or
flag is often displayed at public meetings.128
Second, the Court considers whether the form of expression
“long ha[s] communicated messages from the States.”129 In
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a Ten Commandments
monument in a public park met this criterion because
governments have historically used monuments “to convey some
thought or instill some feeling in those who see the structure.”130
Legislator-led prayers also communicate state messages. The
prayers are delivered by lawmakers, and the custom, which has
been practiced for centuries,131 conveys “a tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country”132 and “expresses a common aspiration to a just and
peaceful society.”133 Moreover, legislators are the principal
audience for the prayers.134 Just as government monuments
instill some feeling in observers, legislator-led prayer
“accommodate[s] the spiritual needs of lawmakers”135 and
“invites [them] to reflect upon shared ideals and common
ends.”136
Lastly, the Court evaluates whether the government
“maintains direct control over the messages conveyed.”137 For
example, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, a
government advertising campaign promoting beef consumption
constituted government speech because the government
“effectively controlled” the message and “exercise[d] final

127
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 591 (plurality opinion) (explaining that board
members at this time may be swearing in new police officers or presenting residents
with proclamations).
128
See id. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing a prayer giver “step[ping] up
to a lectern (emblazoned with the Town’s seal) at the front of the dais”);
Rowan County NC (@rowancountync), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:37 PM),
https://twitter.com/rowancountync/status/932800218403352576 (featuring image of
county seal on display).
129
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2248–49 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009)).
130
555 U.S. at 470.
131
See infra text accompanying note 154.
132
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
133
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
134
Id. at 587 (plurality opinion).
135
Id. at 588.
136
Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
137
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2249 (2015).
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approval authority” over each advertisement.138 Similarly, the
government controls the messages conveyed through
legislator-led prayer.
If a policy contains content-based
restrictions, or requires fellow legislators to pre-approve the
content of each prayer, then the legislature “itself exercises
substantial editorial control over the speech.”139 Even absent
such a policy, government officials deliver the invocations while
acting in their official capacities as legislators.140 Their status as
legislators grants them the opportunity to deliver the
invocation.141 Therefore, the government, through its legislators,
“maintain[s] exclusive and complete control over the content of
the prayers.”142 Accordingly, legislator-led prayer constitutes
government speech.143
Under the First Amendment, “the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content” or “favor one
speaker over another.”144 But when the government speaks, it is
immune from the strictures of the Free Speech Clause.145 The
government “ ‘is entitled to say what it wishes’ and to select the

138

544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005).
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354–55 (4th Cir.
2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation); cf. Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“[M]unicipalities generally exercise editorial control over donated monuments
through prior submission requirements, design input, requested modifications,
written criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content proposals.”).
140
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 289–90 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
141
Id. at 290; see also Turner, 534 F.3d at 355 (“While Turner is the literal
speaker, he is allowed to speak only by virtue of his role as a Council member.”);
Lund, supra note 36, at 1017 (“When a city councilman or county commissioner has
the chance to offer a prayer because of his governmental position, such a prayer is
government speech.”).
142
Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712,
733 (M.D.N.C. 2014)).
143
It does not necessarily follow that everything legislators say is government
speech subject to the Establishment Clause. For example, legislators referencing
their religious faiths during a floor debate would likely not trigger Establishment
Clause scrutiny. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 523 (6th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)
(“In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be
framed.”). And if such references were subject to Establishment Clause scrutiny,
they would be analyzed under a different standard than legislative prayer,
including, quite possibly, the Lemon test. See supra note 11.
144
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(first citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); then citing City
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
145
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009).
139
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views that it wants to express.”146 Without this power, the
government could not function because whenever the government
acts, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and favors that
viewpoint over those it rejects.147
While acknowledging the necessity of the government speech
doctrine, the Court recently cautioned against its expansion
because of the potential for misuse—that is, the “government
could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints.”148 While this is true, the government’s ability to
speak freely is not limitless: government speech is subject to the
proscriptions of the Establishment Clause.149
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE’S CONSTRAINTS ON
LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
The Establishment Clause is the sole constitutional
constraint on government speech.150 As Justice Souter noted in
Summum, “The interaction between the ‘government speech
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however,
begun to be worked out.”151 While Marsh and Town of Greece
prescribe several Establishment Clause principles that regulate
legislative prayer, neither case considered First Amendment
speech principles. Before Town of Greece, several scholars
theorized how government speech doctrine affects Establishment

146
Id. at 467–68 (first quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; then citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); and then citing Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
147
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
148
Id. at 1758.
149
Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. Government speech is also constrained by the
political process. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
235 (2000) (“If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position.”). This Note does not explore the political implications
of legislator-led prayer and whether, if at all, such implications should provide a
basis to invalidate a prayer policy. Compare West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy [and] to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials . . . . [F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”), with Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990) (“Values that are protected against government interference through
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process.”). For an argument that the effects legislator-led prayer can have on the
political process are grounds alone to forbid the practice, see Taxy, supra note 94, at
177–83.
150
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468.
151
Id. at 486 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Clause doctrine—legislative prayer in particular.152 This Note
builds upon this pre-Town of Greece literature, proposing an
analytical rubric for courts to use in determining whether
legislative prayer classified as government speech violates the
Establishment Clause.
A.

The Practice Must Be Rooted in History and Tradition

The threshold inquiry for any legislative prayer case is
whether the challenged practice “fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”153 Legislator-led
prayer plainly does. History reflects a tradition of legislator-led
prayer dating back to before the Founding. For example, in 1775,
the South Carolina Provincial Congress appointed one of its
members to offer prayers at the start of each session.154
Moreover, in 1853, the Senate Judiciary Committee reconsidered
the constitutionality of its chaplaincy program following calls for
its abolition.155 It opted to retain the program, stating that the
Founders “had no fear or jealousy of religion itself, nor did they
wish to see us an irreligious people; they did not intend to
prohibit a just expression of religious devotion by the legislators
of the nation, even in their public character as legislators.”156 For
well over a century, Congress has begun legislative sessions with
member-led prayer.157 In addition, records of various state
legislatures are replete with instances of lawmaker-led prayer.
To name a few, the Illinois Senate has permitted legislator-led
prayer since at least 1849;158 the Connecticut Senate since at
least 1861;159 the Iowa Senate since at least 1862;160 the New
152
See generally Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97; Gaylord, Facially
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97; James H. Knippen II & Elizabeth M.
Farmer, Does Prayer Before Public Bodies Violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment?, DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N BRIEF, Oct. 2011, at 28; Christopher
C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46 (2009).
153
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
154
1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 1112 (Peter Force ed., 1837).
155
S. REP. NO. 32-376, at 1 (1853).
156
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
157
E.g., 26 CONG. REC. 5878 (1894) (Rep. Everett); 27 CONG. REC. 1584 (1895)
(Rep. Everett); 27 CONG. REC. 1629 (1895) (Rep. Everett); 23 CONG. REC. 5571 (1892)
(Rep. McKinney).
158
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 51 (1849) (Sen. Richmond).
159
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, MAY SESSION,
1861, at 231 (1861) (Rep. Denison); id. at 258 (Rep. Mitchell); id. at 406
(Rep. Parmelee).
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Hampshire House of Representatives since at least 1863;161 the
Kansas Senate since at least 1867;162 the Alabama Senate since
at least 1873;163 and the Michigan House of Representatives and
Senate since at least 1879 and 1883, respectively.164 These
examples sufficiently demonstrate a rich historical tradition of
legislator-led prayer.165
It must be acknowledged that the First Congress only
engaged in chaplain-led prayer, not legislator-led prayer.166 But
the Court’s reliance on one record of a single prayer offered at a
Boston City Council meeting in 1910 to support a finding that
local legislative bodies have historically engaged in legislative
prayer167 precludes any basis to undermine the conclusion that,
as a general matter, lawmaker-led prayer is a tradition long
followed in Congress and state legislatures.168 The Court even
recently reaffirmed its reasoning, explaining that although “the
specific practice challenged in Town of Greece lacked the very
direct connection, via the First Congress, to the thinking of those

160

JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE NINTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
70 (1862) (Sen. Watson); id. at 503 (Sen. Teter).
161
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE, JUNE SESSION, 1863, at 90 (1863) (Rep. Stewart); id. at 169, 293, 312
(Rep. Lawrence); see also JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, JUNE SESSION, 1865, at 51 (1865) (Rep. Humphrey);
id. at 58 (Rep. Cutting).
162
SENATE JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
120 (1867) (Sen. Green); id. at 316 (President of the Senate).
163
JOURNAL OF THE SESSION OF 1872–73 OF THE SENATE OF ALABAMA 561
(1873) (Rep. Howell).
164
1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
10 (1879) (Rep. Sharts); 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 228,
303 (1883) (Rep. La Du); see also 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN 12 (1887) (Sen. Westgate); 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN 94 (1897) (Sen. Campbell).
165
The plaintiff in Bormuth argued that many historical examples involve
prayers given by legislators who were also ministers. Bormuth v. County of Jackson,
870 F.3d 494, 510 n.7 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). As the Sixth Circuit recognized, this
is of no constitutional significance because when the prayers were delivered, the
legislators were not acting as ministers but in their official capacities as legislators.
Id.; see also id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“And what of a legislator who is also a
person of the cloth? Could John Danforth but not John McCain give an invocation?
When a line offers no meaningful distinctions, it is a good time to ask whether the
court should draw it.”).
166
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J.,
concurring).
167
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).
168
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 510.
OF IOWA
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who were responsible for framing the First Amendment,” the
practice nevertheless “fi[t] within the tradition long followed in
Congress and the state legislatures.”169
In addition to having deep historical roots, legislator-led
prayer remains prevalent across all levels of government today.
In Congress, members of both chambers lead opening prayers.170
Furthermore, thirty-one state legislatures permit legislator-led
prayer.171
Some states have enacted legislation or rules
permitting the practice.172 In fact, the Rhode Island Legislature
and Maryland’s House of Delegates only allow legislator-led
invocations.173 Finally, countless local legislative bodies across
the country open meetings with legislator-led prayer, many of
which engage in exclusively legislator-led prayer.174 The robust,
long-standing tradition of legislator-led prayer establishes that
the custom is not per se unconstitutional.

169
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2088–89 (2019)
(alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577).
170
See 161 CONG. REC. S3313 (daily ed. May 23, 2015) (Sen. Lankford);
159 CONG. REC. S3915-01 (daily ed. June 4, 2013) (Sen. Cowan); 155 CONG. REC.
S13401 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2009) (Sen. Barrasso); 119 CONG. REC. 17,441 (1973)
(Rep. Hudnut III).
171
See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
5-151 to -152 tbl. 02-5.52 (2002).
172
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-160(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act
No. 90) (authorizing local governments to adopt policies to permit lawmaker-led
prayer); MICH. LEGISLATURE, MICHIGAN LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK & DIRECTORY:
99TH LEGISLATURE 2017–2018, at 153 (2017) (“The Clerk shall arrange for a Member
to offer an invocation . . . at the opening of each session of the House.”).
173
See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 171, at 5-152 tbl.
02-5.52; Kate Havard, In Delegates They Trust: Md. House Members Lead Secular
Prayer, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpolitics/in-delegates-they-trust-md-house-members-lead-secular-prayer/2013/03/09/
571fef8e-810a-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7c9b
f1d695a1.
174
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and Twenty-One Other
States in Support of Jackson County and Affirmance at 10–12, Bormuth v. County of
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 15-1896), 2017 WL 1710341
(collecting data on counties in the Sixth Circuit that engage in lawmaker-led
prayer); Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 12 Other States
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 12–19, 23–26, Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d
407 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1591), 2015
WL 4692468 (collecting data on counties and cities in the Fourth Circuit that engage
in lawmaker-led prayer).
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B. Government Speech Doctrine Requires a Showing of
Impermissible Intent for a Prayer Practice To Violate the
Establishment Clause
Marsh and Town of Greece prescribe several limits on
legislative prayer generally. First, the prayer opportunity must
not be “exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief.”175 Second, prayer-giver
selection must not “stem[] from an impermissible motive.”176
Finally, the legislature must “maintain[] a policy of
nondiscrimination” and not demonstrate “aversion or
bias . . . against minority faiths.”177 All of these limits hinge on
the legislature’s subjective intent.178
Government speech doctrine demands that these limits be
applied to require a manifestation of impermissible intent on
behalf of the legislature for a prayer practice to run afoul of the
Establishment Clause. First and foremost, a prayer practice
must not be exploited. As Professor Gaylord explains, “as a
speaker, the government violates the Establishment Clause not
simply by engaging in facially religious speech but by engaging in
such speech for the purpose of promoting or advancing
religion.”179 Thus, the legislature must have a legitimate purpose
for engaging in legislative prayer,180 and that purpose “must ‘be
sincere and not a sham.’ ”181
175

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014) (quoting Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)).
176
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–94.
177
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585.
178
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 823 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court makes
the subjective motivation of legislators the decisive criterion for judging the
constitutionality of a state legislative practice.”). Judge Sutton argued that the
subjective intent of lawmakers should not be relevant to an Establishment Clause
analysis and that courts should look to the “objective content of the prayer [and] the
impact it has on the listeners.” Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494,
524 (Sutton, J., concurring). This approach is irreconcilable with government
speech doctrine and Supreme Court precedent. See infra notes 179–190 and
accompanying text.
179
Gaylord, Facially Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 401
(emphasis added).
180
The Supreme Court has recognized several legitimate purposes for engaging
in legislative prayer, including to “remind[] lawmakers to transcend petty
differences in pursuit of a higher purpose,” “to lend gravity to the occasion and
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage,” to “unite lawmakers in their
common effort,” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575, 583, “to acknowledge the place
religion holds in the lives of many private citizens,” “to accommodate the spiritual
needs of lawmakers and connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the
Framers” to “reflect the values [lawmakers] hold as private citizens,” and to provide
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Second, absent proof of impermissible intent, incidental
advancement or endorsement of a particular religion should not
render a prayer practice unconstitutional.182 This is because
government
messages
are
susceptible
to
various
183
interpretations.
As the Court explained in Summum with
regard to the Ten Commandments monument that constituted
government speech, “Even when a monument features the
written word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted,
and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety
of ways.”184 How a prayer practice is perceived objectively by
observers should therefore not be relevant to the constitutional
analysis: “there is no place for a ‘heckler’s veto.’ ”185
Furthermore, if a legislature is required to offer prayers of a
variety of faiths—that is, alter its message—to prevent observers
from perceiving advancement or endorsement of one faith, it
loses its fundamental right as speaker to determine the content
of its message.186
This intent-focused approach fits comfortably within the
Court’s existing legislative prayer jurisprudence. Generally, the
Establishment Clause forbids the government from expressing
messages that endorse, favor, or promote religion irrespective of
the government’s purpose for engaging in that expression.187 But
this principle does not apply with like force in the legislative
prayer context.
In Marsh, the Presbyterian chaplain’s
sixteen-year tenure did not in itself unconstitutionally advance
that faith because no “impermissible motive” was shown; the
chaplain was selected for his “performance and personal
qualities,” not his religious faith.188 And in Town of Greece, eight
“an opportunity for [lawmakers] to show who and what they are,” id. at 587–88
(plurality opinion).
181
Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1056; Gaylord, Facially
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 402.
182
See Kristopher L. Caudle, Note, Unanswered Prayers: Lund v. Rowan County
and the Permissiveness of Sectarian Prayers in Municipalities, 12 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 625, 659–60 (2014).
183
Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1054; Gaylord, Facially
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 393.
184
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474 (2009); see also id. at 475
(“[T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and
sentiments in the minds of different observers . . . .”).
185
Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1052; Gaylord, Facially
Religious Government Speech, supra note 97, at 339.
186
Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1054.
187
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
188
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983).
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years of exclusively Christian prayer-givers did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the town did not select its
prayer-givers in an intentionally discriminatory manner.189
Accordingly, the relevant inquiry must be “whether the
legislature’s practice—whatever that practice might be—evinces
an unlawful discriminatory motive.”190
C. Areas of Inquiry That May Evince Impermissible Intent
Determining the intent behind a lawmaker-led prayer policy
is no different than any other legislative prayer policy. The
following subsections provide a framework based on four
particular aspects of prayer practices, or areas of inquiry, that
may evince impermissible intent: (1) the stated purpose of the
prayer practice; (2) the prayer-giver selection process;
(3) content-based restrictions or requirements imposed by the
legislature; and (4) the content of the prayers. Further, each
subsection analyzes the legislator-led prayer practices in Lund
and Bormuth and the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ reasoning.
1.

The Stated Purpose of the Prayer Practice

A first area of inquiry to identify impermissible intent is the
stated purpose of the prayer practice. Take, for example, the
following resolution: “The Town of Utopia Board of Trustees
hereby adopts the following prayer policy for the purpose of
advancing the teachings of Jesus Christ, God the Father’s only
Son, the one and only Lord and Savior.” The board’s express
purpose—to advance Christianity—renders the policy facially
unconstitutional.
Courts can also identify impermissible intent in remarks
made by lawmakers during public meetings—separate from the
prayers—or through deposition testimony. For example, in
Williamson v. Brevard County, commissioners stated in
deposition testimony that the opening prayer is “a long-standing
tradition of honoring the Christian community” and that
“allowing Christian invocations show[s] the board’s support for
Christianity.”191 As the Eleventh Circuit held, engaging in

189

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014).
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 311 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Agee, J., dissenting).
191
928 F.3d 1296, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original).
190
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legislative prayer for these purposes violates the Supreme
Court’s command that the custom not be exploited to advance one
religion to the exclusion of others.192
Neither board of commissioners in Lund and Bormuth
adopted a formal resolution stating the purpose of the
invocations. During the litigation, Rowan County averred that
the prayers at its meetings were offered “for the edification and
benefit of the commissioners and to solemnize the meeting.”193
Similarly, Jackson County claimed its prayers served a
ceremonial function, similar to those in Town of Greece.194 Both
purported purposes are legitimate, and there was no evidence
that these purported purposes were insincere or a pretext.
2.

The Prayer-Giver Selection Process

A second area of inquiry is prayer-giver selection. A
legislator-led prayer policy can either extend the prayer
opportunity to legislators or restrict it to them. The policies in
Lund and Bormuth fell into the latter category. Adopting a
policy that simply extends the prayer opportunity to legislators
cannot in itself, at least facially, violate the Establishment
Clause.195 But a policy that restricts the opportunity to them can,
if adopted for impermissible reasons.
There are at least three legitimate reasons for a legislature
to restrict the prayer opportunity to its members. First, the
legislature may wish to maintain absolute control over the
content of the prayers. If the legislature extends the prayer
opportunity to nonmembers, it necessarily forfeits that control. A
legislature may fear that guest prayer-givers will offer
disparaging or offensive invocations, which would defeat the
unifying purpose of legislative prayer.196 The Maryland House of
192

Id. at 1315 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
Lund, 863 F.3d at 274.
194
See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at
4–6, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d,
849 F.3d 266 (4th Cir.), rev’d en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 2:13-cv-1376MOB-MJH), 2014 WL 12768703.
195
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
196
It is not uncommon for guest prayer-givers to deliver controversial
invocations. For example, a member of the Satanic Temple concluded her prayer
before the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly in Alaska with “Hail Satan,”
prompting legislators and attendees to walk out. Brie Stimson, Woman’s ‘Hail Satan’
Invocation Prompts Walkout from Alaska Town Meeting, FOX NEWS (June 21, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/hail-satan-invoked-during-alaska-governmentmeeting-prayer. In addition, a guest minister concluded his prayer before the
193
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Delegates, for example, switched to a strictly legislator-led
prayer policy after some guest ministers offended members with
“overly Christian prayers that sometimes veered into politically
touchy subjects, such as abortion.”197 Because the House of
Delegates acted with a permissible purpose—to foster a more
inclusive atmosphere and to prevent further offense—it would be
insignificant whether all legislators and subsequent prayers were
of one faith.
Second, a legislature may be concerned over the threat of
litigation. Denying any prospective prayer-giver’s request to
deliver an invocation risks creating a misperception that the
legislature is discriminating among prayer-givers.198 Indeed,
multiple courts have struck down prayer policies on the basis of
discriminatory prayer-giver selection.199
As Justice Alito
explained in Town of Greece:
The effect of requiring such exactitude would be to pressure
towns to forswear altogether the practice of having a prayer
before meetings of the town council. Many local officials,
puzzled by our often puzzling Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and terrified of the legal fees that may result
from a lawsuit claiming a constitutional violation, already think
that the safest course is to ensure that local government is a
religion-free zone.200

Minnesota House of Representatives by insinuating that President Obama is
not a Christian, sparking outrage among legislators. Jay Weiner, Legislative
Firestorm Erupts Over Bradlee Dean’s Prayer, MINNPOST (May 20, 2011),
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2011/05/legislative-firestorm-erupts-overbradlee-deans-prayer/.
197
Havard, supra note 173.
198
Cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585 (2014) (finding the town’s
policy nondiscriminatory in part because the town “would welcome a prayer by any
minister or layman who wished to give one”).
199
See, e.g., Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1296, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019)
(holding a prayer practice unconstitutional in part because “[t]he selection
procedures as practiced t[ook] religious beliefs into account, . . . favoring some creeds
over others”); Hunt v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, slip op. at
15–17 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (holding unconstitutional a prayer policy that
opened the invocation opportunity only to leaders of “religious associations with an
established presence in the Kenai Peninsula Borough” because faiths practiced by
some residents of the borough, including Judaism and Satanism, were excluded
under the policy).
200
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Am. Legion v.
Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2097 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[G]overnment bodies trying to comply with the inevitably arbitrary decisions of the
courts would face . . . intractable questions.” (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 596
(Alito, J., concurring))).
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Accordingly, a desire to avoid the threat of litigation is adequate
justification to restrict a prayer opportunity to lawmakers.201
Lastly, legislator-led prayer better “accommodate[s] the
spiritual needs of lawmakers,” one of the primary purposes of
legislative prayer.202 As the Supreme Court explained, legislative
prayer “reflect[s] the values [legislators] hold as private
citizens.”203 Allowing legislators to offer the prayers themselves
gives them the opportunity to personally “show who and what
they are.”204
There are ways courts can determine whether a legislature’s
decision to restrict the prayer policy to its members is motived by
impermissible intent. First, courts can look to legislators’
deposition testimony and public statements. For example, if
members of an all-Christian legislature state that the prayer
opportunity is reserved to lawmakers to ensure all prayers are
Christian, the policy would be plainly unconstitutional. Second,
courts can infer an impermissible, discriminatory purpose in how
the legislator-led prayer policy is carried out. If, for example, a
board rescinds the prayer opportunity from a commissioner of a
minority faith or discontinues the practice altogether when a new
commissioner of a minority faith is elected, such action would
indicate disfavor toward the minority commissioner’s faith.205
Williamson provides an excellent example of intentional
discriminatory prayer-giver selection.
In Williamson, the
Eleventh Circuit held unconstitutional a practice of each
commissioner selecting a guest minister on a rotating basis
because the commissioners “used [their plenary discretion] to
discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs, favoring some
monotheistic religions over others and disfavoring and
excluding—at least—religions that are polytheistic, pantheistic,
or otherwise outside of the ‘mainstream.’ ”206 In deposition
testimony, all but one commissioner indicated that prospective

201

Rowan County, for example, was ordered to pay $285,000 in legal fees to the
American Civil Liberties Union. Caleb Parke, Cost of Prayer: North Carolina
County Pays $285G for Opening Meetings in Jesus’ Name, FOX NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/cost-of-prayer-north-carolina-county-pays-285k-foropening-meetings-in-jesus-name.
202
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion).
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 310 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(Agee, J., dissenting).
206
Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019).
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prayer-givers’ religious beliefs would significantly affect whether
or not they would be invited to deliver an invocation.207 In
addition, some commissioners expressed that the prayer
opportunity was meant only for people of particular types of
religions, indicating that prospective prayer-givers of certain
faiths would either be more closely scrutinized or outright
banned from offering an invocation.208
Accordingly, the
prayer-giver selection procedure had been unconstitutionally
exploited for an impermissible purpose—to favor monotheistic
religions to the exclusion of others.209
Under the prayer policy in Lund, each commissioner was
afforded the opportunity to offer the opening prayer on a rotating
basis.210
When the plaintiffs brought this action, all five
commissioners were Protestant Christian.211 Judge Wilkinson
concluded that the board restricted the prayer opportunity to its
members to ensure that the prayers remained Christian.212 This
conclusion is sheer judicial ipse dixit. The board rotated the
prayer opportunity among its members as a matter of
long-standing tradition.213 The record did not indicate when the
tradition began or why the board that adopted the practice chose
to restrict the prayer opportunity to commissioners. Thus, there
was no basis to conclude that the board sought to advance
Christianity; and because there was no evidence of purposeful
exploitation, any perceived advancement of Christianity was
merely incidental and therefore constitutionally insignificant.
Judge Wilkinson also emphasized that the policy was too
“rigid” and “restrictive” and failed to embrace religious
pluralism.214 This reasoning is flawed. First, municipalities are
only required to maintain a policy of nondiscrimination; they are
not required to “promote ‘a “diversity” of religious views.’ ”215
Second, a strictly legislator-led prayer policy can be more flexible
and inclusive than the policies upheld in Marsh and Town of

207

Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1313–14.
209
Id. at 1314–15.
210
See Lund, 863 F.3d at 273.
211
Id. at 282.
212
Id. at 282–83.
213
Id. at 273.
214
Id. at 282.
215
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586 (2014) (quoting Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)).
208
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Greece.216 Under a fixed-chaplain policy, a Christian chaplain
can offer Christian prayers throughout the course of his tenure,
and absent an impermissible motive, the chaplain can be
reappointed over and over again, up to at least sixteen years.217
This could effectively undermine some of the purposes of
legislative prayer. Christian prayers referencing Jesus Christ
would neither “reflect the values” Muslim legislators hold nor
give Muslim legislators the opportunity “to show who and what
they are.”218 The same might be true for Muslim legislators
under a rotating guest minister policy in a municipality with no
mosque.219
The prayer policy in Bormuth was nearly identical to the
policy in Lund. The Sixth Circuit found no evidence that the
board adopted its practice with discriminatory intent.220
Accordingly, because the prayer practice was “facially neutral,”
Judge Griffin found it “immaterial” that all nine commissioners
were Christian at the time the practice was challenged.221
One commentator writes that Jackson County’s policy allows
the board to “choose[] which persons can and cannot give the
opening prayers based solely on their religious sect.”222 This is an
utter mischaracterization of the policy. The board does not pick
and choose prayer-givers. Each commissioner is afforded the
opportunity to deliver the invocation when his or her turn in the
rotation arises. As Judge Griffin explained, “Were Mr. Bormuth
elected to the Jackson County Board of Commissioners, he could
freely begin a legislative session with an invocation of his
choosing, under the religion-neutral Jackson County prayer
practice.”223 If anyone selects prayer-givers based on their
religious sect, it is the voters of Jackson County.224
The Sixth Circuit also addressed evidentiary challenges over
whether statements contained in video recordings of committee
meetings published to the board’s website after litigation
216

Lund, 863 F.3d at 310 (Agee, J., dissenting).
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–86 (1983).
218
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion).
219
See id. at 585–86 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Constitution does not require [a
town] to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to
achieve religious balancing.”).
220
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 513 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring).
221
Id. at 513–14 (majority opinion).
222
Hill, supra note 94, at 37.
223
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 513.
224
See id. at 523 (Sutton, J., concurring).
217
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commenced were part of the record and should be considered on
appeal.225
At one meeting in particular where the board
discussed potential alternatives to its legislator-led prayer policy,
a commissioner expressed the following concern:
If somebody from the public wants to come before us and say
they are an ordained minister, we are going to have to allow
them as well. And I think we are opening a Pandora’s Box here
because you are going to get members of the public who are
going to come up at public comment, and we are going to create
a lot of problems here when certain people come up here and
say things that they are not going to like.226

The court ultimately declined to consider these remarks, noting
that “even if [it] were to consider the proffered videos, [its]
disposition would not change.”227
This statement, standing alone, does not evince an
impermissible, discriminatory motive. As discussed, there are
several legitimate reasons for restricting the prayer opportunity
to lawmakers, including to control the prayer content to prevent
controversial invocations.
The commissioner’s remarks,
rationally construed, express a concern over guest prayer-givers
delivering controversial invocations. Thus, this statement does
not suggest that the board acted with discriminatory intent in
adopting and maintaining its strictly legislator-led prayer
practice.
3.

Content-Based Restrictions or Requirements Imposed by the
Legislature

A third area of inquiry to identify impermissible intent is
content-based restrictions or requirements imposed by the
legislature. In Town of Greece, the Court rejected arguments
that the guest ministers’ prayers must be nonsectarian because
such a requirement would force the government to “act as
supervisors and censors of religious speech.”228
The Court
concluded that “[o]nce it invites prayer into the public sphere,
government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own
225

Id. at 499 (majority opinion).
CountyofJackson, Personnel & Finance Committee Hearing November 12,
2013 Jackson County, MI, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2013) (37:55–38:16),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOOClwZpaXc. These statements were neither
presented to the district court nor mentioned in Bormuth’s initial appellate brief,
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Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581 (2014) (emphasis added).
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God or gods as conscience dictates.”229 As Professor Corbin points
out, censorship indicates the government is acting as a sovereign
and regulating private speech, and inviting prayer into the public
sphere suggests the government is hosting a forum for private
speech.230
But when legislative prayer is classified as government
speech, Town of Greece’s instruction that a legislature must
forfeit control over the content of the prayers should not apply. If
the government is speaking, it has absolute authority to select
the content of its message.231 Thus, a legislature could, to an
extent, impose content restrictions on its individual members’
prayers to maintain control over its message.
To illustrate, a requirement that prayers not denigrate
religious minorities or nonbelievers would likely be lawful
because it is motivated by a legitimate purpose—to ensure the
legislature’s message conforms to the Establishment Clause.232
Conversely, a prohibition of Muslim prayers, or references to
“Allah,” would likely be unlawful because it reflects disfavor
toward Islam.
Likewise, a requirement that prayers be
exclusively Christian would also likely be unlawful because it
manifests a motive to advance Christianity.
Moreover, a legislator-led prayer policy with a requirement
that all prayers be nonsectarian would likely be constitutional.
The Fourth Circuit confronted this issue in Turner v. City
Council of Fredericksburg,233 a case decided before Town of
Greece. In Turner, the court classified the prayers as government
speech and upheld the nonsectarian requirement because it was
“designed to make the prayers accessible to people who come
from a variety of backgrounds, not to exclude or disparage a
particular faith.”234 The court noted that as speaker, the
government may select the messages it would, and would not,
229

Id. at 582.
See Corbin, supra note 103, at 42.
231
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (“[T]he fundamental rule under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen the State is the speaker,
it may make content-based choices.”); see also Knippen II & Farmer, supra note 152,
at 33 (“[T]he government, as speaker, has free reign [sic] over the content of the
religious message.”).
232
See Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1064.
233
534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by
designation).
234
Id. at 356.
230
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like to express.235 This reasoning remains sound even after Town
of Greece. First, a nonsectarian requirement does not reflect an
impermissible motive, but rather a desire to be inclusive.
Second, Town of Greece spoke to a nonsectarian requirement in
the context of the government regulating speech, not the
government itself speaking. Lastly, if “[p]rayer that reflects
beliefs specific to only some creeds can still serve to solemnize
the occasion,” so too can prayers specific to no religion that
invoke universal themes.236
Similarly, a legislator-led prayer policy that requires that all
prayers be sectarian or theistic would also likely be
constitutional.
Such a policy does not “advance any one”
religion;237 if anything, it advances religion over irreligion. By
holding that prayers need not be nonsectarian, Town of Greece
permits government to favor religion over irreligion in the
legislative prayer context.238 To illustrate, in Barker v. Conroy,
the D.C. Circuit held that the House of Representatives’ chaplain
did not violate the Establishment Clause when he denied an
atheist’s request to deliver a nonreligious invocation because the
House’s rules require that all invocations be religious.239 The
court reasoned that, “although the Court has warned against
discriminating among religions or tolerating a pattern of prayers
that proselytize or disparage certain faiths or beliefs, it has never
suggested that legislatures must allow secular as well as
religious prayer.”240
The prayer policies in Lund and Bormuth were neutral with
respect to prayer content. The boards did not impose any
content-based restrictions or requirements on their members.241
The commissioners were free to offer a prayer to their God or
gods—or to no god at all—as their consciences dictated.
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Id. (quoting Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276,
288 (4th Cir. 2005)).
236
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583 (2014).
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Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
794–95 (1983)).
238
See Gaylord, When the Exception, supra note 97, at 1065 (“[B]ecause Marsh
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the beginning of its meetings, the government must be able to exclude nonreligious
or anti-religious speakers . . . .”).
239
921 F.3d 1118, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
240
Id. at 1131.
241
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 272–73 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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Accordingly, the absence of content-based restrictions or
requirements is no basis to question the constitutionality of a
legislative prayer practice.
4.

The Prayers Themselves: Advance, Disparage, and
Proselytize

The fourth and final area of inquiry to identify impermissible
intent that this Note explores is prayer content. In reviewing a
prayer practice, impermissible intent may seem apparent from
the prayers. Marsh, however, instructs that judges should not
concern themselves with the content of the prayers absent indicia
of exploitation.242 Town of Greece reaffirmed this directive in
dismissing arguments that prayers must be nonsectarian, but it
subsequently approved judicial review of prayers in stating that
“[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate,
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a
challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely
establish a constitutional violation.”243 Thus, judicial review of
prayers is permitted—and indeed necessary—to determine
whether a practice over time has been exploited to advance a
particular religion, proselytize, or disparage nonbelievers or
religious minorities. But to what extent? How closely should
judges parse the content of prayers? Line-drawing problems are
inevitable.
Without supplementary proof of purposeful exploitation, the
content of prayers alone cannot unconstitutionally “advance” a
particular religion. Town of Greece clarified that sectarian
legislative prayer is permissible “so long as the practice over time
is not ‘exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage
any other, faith or belief.’ ”244 Prayer is inherently religious.
“The Supreme Court has long taken as given that prayer
presumes a higher power.”245 And as the Tenth Circuit has
explained, “all prayers ‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in one
way or another. The act of praying to a supreme power assumes
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Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581–83, 585 (2014).
244
Id. at 583 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95).
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the existence of that supreme power.”246 Therefore, the content of
prayers in and of itself cannot demonstrate intent to exploit a
prayer practice to advance a particular religion.
Prayer content can, however, reflect intent to proselytize.
Proselytization has been invoked in several facets of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.247 But the Supreme Court
has neither articulated a concrete definition of proselytization
nor provided a practical standard or test to identify it.248 In the
legislative prayer context, many lower courts have sought to
delineate what constitutes proselytization, but no clear judicial
consensus has emerged.249 In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, the
Fourth Circuit distinguished proselytizing from advancing,
stating, “To ‘proselytize’ on behalf of a particular religious belief
necessarily means to seek to ‘convert’ others to that belief,
whereas to ‘advance’ a religious belief means simply to ‘forward,
further, [or] promote’ the belief.”250 The Tenth Circuit drew a
similar distinction in Snyder v. Murray City Corp., describing
proselytization as “a more aggressive form of advancement”—
specifically, an “effort by the government to convert citizens to
particular sectarian views.”251 The Tenth Circuit concluded that

246

Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
247
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Ten
Commandments display); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 296–97
(2000) (student-led, student-initiated prayer); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (passive religious displays); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489
U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (tax exemptions regarding religious periodicals); Marsh, 463 U.S. at
794–95 (legislative prayer); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 627 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (state aide to church-related schools); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (religious instruction in
public schools).
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Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech Is
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83,
85 (2007).
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See Caudle, supra note 182, at 659.
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376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original). In Wynne, the
Fourth Circuit invalidated a town council’s prayer practice because it advanced
Christianity by frequently referencing “Jesus Christ” to the exclusion of other faiths.
Id. at 301.
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159 F.3d at 1234 n.10 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14, 794–95).
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only legislative prayer that “aggressively advocates a specific
religious creed, or that derogates another religious faith or
doctrine” will violate the Establishment Clause.252
Prayer content can also reflect intent to disparage. Prayer
content may be so explicit that it unquestionably and
unambiguously reflects a motive to denigrate—for example, an
invocation that explicitly states another faith is inferior and
believers of that faith are damned. In Snyder, a private citizen
sought to deliver an invocation that condemned politicians who
believe in legislative prayer as “self-righteous,” “hypocritical,”
“mis-guided, weak and stupid.”253 The Tenth Circuit held that
denying this prospective prayer-giver’s request was lawful
because “[n]ot only does [the] prayer explicitly attack the genre
itself, it also disparages those who believe that legislative prayer
is appropriate.”254
Government speech doctrine demands that the subjective
intent of the prayer-giver determines whether invocations
constitute proselytization or disparagement. Christian Keiner
proposes a standard of proselytizing that is primarily objective,
considering the potential impact the expression would have on a
reasonable observer.255 But such a definition cannot apply to
legislator-led prayer because, as government speech, the
government’s message is not determined by how others perceive
it.256 As Professor Gaylord explains, “[T]he government’s reasons
for engaging in the speech (e.g., solemnizing an event or
participating in the long-standing tradition of legislative prayer)
may differ significantly from how others interpret that
message.”257 A legislator who offers a prayer for the purpose of
solemnizing the meeting is not proselytizing simply because
someone construes the prayer in that manner.258
Judge Wilkinson found that the Rowan County
commissioners’ prayers advanced Christianity, proselytized, and
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Id. at 1234–35 (“Because Snyder’s prayer seeks to convert his audience to his
belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is itself
proselytizing.”).
253
Id. at 1228 n.3.
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See Keiner, supra note 248, at 105–06.
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257
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See id. at 1054 (“[T]he fact that third parties might ascribe different
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intended a specific message . . . .”).
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disparaged non-Christians. Before reviewing the content of the
prayers, he noted that “Town of Greece instructs courts to
consider a prayer practice from the perspective of the ‘reasonable
observer.’ ”259 This interpretation of Town of Greece is misguided.
First, the reasonable observer standard was invoked with respect
to whether the prayers were unduly coercive, not whether the
legislature exploited the prayer practice to proselytize.260 The
standards are distinct.
Second, a reasonable observer, or
endorsement, standard cannot be applied to legislative prayer
because it “presupposes a premise that [government speech
doctrine] rejects—that the government’s message can be
determined by the meaning that others attribute to the
government.”261
In reviewing the content of the prayers, Judge Wilkinson
erroneously made his subjective perception the determining
criterion for whether the commissioners were advancing
Christianity, proselytizing, or denigrating religious minorities.
For example, he construed the following prayer as an “invocation
advocat[ing] that the community take up the Christian faith”:
Father, I pray that all may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus,
and He in you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the
world may believe that you sent Jesus to save us from our sins.
May we hunger and thirst for righteousness, be made perfect in
holiness, and be preserved, whole and entire, spirit, soul, and
body, irreproachable at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.262

A construction that this prayer “urged attendees to embrace
Christianity”263 is one of many possible meanings a listener could
attribute to it—and, frankly, a very attenuated one. Others may
think that this is simply a legislator calling for his fellow
lawmakers to unite “before they embark on the fractious business
of governing.”264 One commissioner maintained, “We are not
259

Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586–87 (2014) (plurality
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lend gravity to public proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the
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proselytizing; we are just praying in the only way that we know
how.”265 In a similar vein, Judge Wilkinson thought the following
prayer denigrated religious minorities:
Lord, we confess that we have not loved you with all our heart,
and mind and strength, and that we have not loved one another
as Christ loves us. We have also neglected to follow the
guidance of your Holy Spirit and have allowed sin to enter into
our lives.266

This
prayer,
“implicitly
‘signal[ed]
disfavor
toward’
non-Christians,” Judge Wilkinson stated.267 Note the use of the
word “implicitly.” Disfavor toward non-Christians is simply the
message Judge Wilkinson himself implied.268 Others may have
perceived a different message—perhaps a call for commissioners
to reflect upon past disagreements with one another and to be
mindful of their future words, actions, or both. Observers and
judges are bound to perceive prayers differently.269 The Fourth
Circuit’s failure to recognize the inapplicability of a reasonable
observer standard in light of the prayers being government
speech was fatal to its analysis.
In Bormuth, Judge Griffin similarly reviewed the content of
several prayers offered by commissioners. But rather than
parsing the content of individual prayers, he evaluated the
prayers more generally. He found the prayers to be solemn and
lives of many private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to proselytize
or force truant constituents into the pews.”).
265
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267
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268
Id. at 316–17 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“At most, [the majority] subjectively
intuits the prayers ‘implicitly signaled disfavor toward non-Christians’ whenever
they ‘portrayed the failure to love Jesus or follow his teachings as spiritual defects.’ ”
(quoting id. at 285 (majority opinion))).
269
Compare, e.g., id. at 286 (majority opinion) (“By proclaiming the spiritual
and moral supremacy of Christianity, characterizing the political community as a
Christian one, and urging adherents of other religions to embrace Christianity as
the sole path to salvation, the Board in its prayer practice stepped over the line.”),
with id. at 316 (Agee, J., dissenting) (“[T]he prayers by the commissioners never
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principles of the Christian faith, or anything else traditionally understood to be
words imploring conversion. In addition, none of the prayers here threaten
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1235 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc))).
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respectful and used as a means to invoke Divine guidance before
engaging in lawmaking, similar to those in Town of Greece.270
Bormuth called the court’s attention to one portion of one prayer,
which he believed denigrated nonbelievers and religious
minorities: “Bless the Christians worldwide who seem to be
targets of killers and extremists.”271 But the court found that this
one remark, even if it were construed as a form of denigration—
which would be quite an attenuated construction272—did not
despoil the Board’s practice, which overall fit within this
country’s tradition of legislator-led prayer.273 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the Jackson County Board of Commissioners used
the prayers to “seek guidance to ‘make good decisions that will be
best for generations to come’ and express well-wishes to military
and community members.”274 Accordingly, because the board
used its prayer practice for permissible purposes, the content of
the prayers was constitutionally insignificant.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court must clarify the uncertainties
surrounding legislative prayer. The Court’s failure to address
whether legislative prayers are government or private speech
risks the continued invalidation of prayer practices that adhere
to the “tradition long followed in Congress and the state
legislatures.”275 Legislator-led prayer is one such tradition.
Legislator-led prayer constitutes government speech; therefore,
only prayer policies motivated by impermissible intent should
violate the Establishment Clause. Had the Fourth Circuit
considered that the prayers were government speech, and how
government speech doctrine affects the Establishment Clause
inquiry, it would have had no basis to strike down Rowan
County’s prayer practice. Government speech doctrine is, in
effect, legislator-led prayer’s saving grace.
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